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obligation of Thirteen Thousand Dollars ($13,000.00), equal to 
Plaintiff/Respondent's obligation to indicate their obligation 
to pay to Plaintiff/Respondent the amount he was paying to his 
credit union on the mobile home (page 19). Several documents 
were exchanged by the parties in this transaction. They were: 
Chattel Mortgage 
Bill of Sale 
Real Estate Contract 
Note to American Heritage 
Note from American Heritage 
Page 27 
Page 26,27 
Page 25 
Page 25 
Page 19 
These documents were reviewed by the parties at the closing (page 
16,18) and all documents showed American Heritage Builders, Inc. 
as one party and Plaintiff/Respondent as the other (page 29). 
There was no request by Plaintiff/Respondent nor discussion 
between the parties that Defendant/Appellant act as guarantor of 
the note or that he should sign personally (page 29,30,34). 
Plaintiff/Respondent said he couldn't recall if he knew he was 
dealing with a corporation. He left all those details to his 
wife (page 36). Wife of Plaintiff/Respondent said she knew 
they were dealing with American Heritage Builders, Inc. (page 59). 
Subsequently, American Heritage Builders, Inc. fell into hard 
times and failed to make some of the payments as agreed (page 71 • 
Suit was brought against American Heritage Builders, Inc. and 
Larry Sorenson and judgment was rendered against American Heritage 
Builders, Inc. (page 46). Plaintiff/Respondent recovered mobile 
home at sheriff's sale (page 47) and resold the mobile home, 
paid off the note that he owed to the credit union and recovered 
Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000.00) for himself (page 50). The 
mobile home was out of Plaintiff/Respondent's possession from 
-2-
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oecember 1973 to January 1977, or a total of approximately 
three years, and during that time, American Heritage Builders, 
Inc. missed only five payments until the suit was filed, for 
a total of Nine Hundred and Forty Five Dollars ($945.00) (page 
38, 39). Action was continued on the note and judgment was 
rendered in favor of Plaintiff/Respondent and against Defendant/ 
Appellant for the amount of the note. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: DEFENDANT/APPELLANT SIGNED NOTE AS OFFICER OF 
CORPORATION AND NOT IN INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, NOR AS 
GUARANTOR. 
Five documents were exchanged between the parties at the 
time of the transaction, which gave rise to the note complained 
of below, the note being one of the documents. All of the 
documents showed American Heritage Builders, Inc. as one party 
with Defendant/Appellant Sorenson signing as an officer of 
said corporation and with Plaintiff/Respondent Kiniry as one 
of the other parties. Only one document, the note given 
from American Heritage Builders, Inc. to Plaintiff/Respondent 
is in any way ambiguous. In First Bank & Trust Company v 
Post, 12 UCC Reporting Service 512, the Illinois Appellate 
Court handled a similar fact situation. In this matter, 
the defendants signed two documents, a chattel mortgage secur-
ity agreement and a chattel mortgage note. The chattel 
mortgage security agreement granted to the Plaintiff, a security 
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interest in a lathe as collateral for the loan. On the security 
agreement, the words "Palatine Welding Sales and Manufacturing, 
Inc." were hand written, once at the top left of the document 
and again on the first line provided for signatures with the 
defendant's signatures beneath. The chattel mortgage note 
did not bear the name of the corporation. In the area provided 
for the signatures the names of the three defendants appeared 
with no designation of either the person represented or their 
representative capacity. The plaintiff in this matter argued 
that the court should affirm the judgment of the trial court 
by giving him judgment against the officers of the corporation. 
The court answered in part as follows: "Second, the note and 
security agreement were executed contemporaneously and as 
part of the same transaction and concerned the same subject 
matter and therefore, should be construed together ... The 
security agreement clearly shows that the corporation, Palatine 
Welding Sales & Manufacturing Company, Inc. was a party to 
this loan transaction. The note appears to be signed by the 
defendants, personally, but the reverse side bears a guarantee 
wherein the same persons personally guarantee their own signa-
tures, a seemingly senseless redundancy. When construed together 
the form of these instruments fairly indicates to the eye of 
common sense that the makers intended to sign the face of the 
note as officers of the corporation." 
If the documents exchanged as part of the transaction 
in this matter, in addition to the note complained of, are all 
construed together with the note, there can be no doubt that 
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the intent of the parties was that the transaction was between 
American Heritage Builders, Inc. and Plaintiff/Respondent as 
the parties with Defendant/Appellant signing.for the corporation 
as an agent and in his corporate capacity and not as guarantor 
nor in any personal capacity. 
Testimony before the Court below by Defendant/Appellant 
was that he never intended to sign in an individual capacity, 
but only in his representative capacity as an agent of the 
corporation. The testimony of Plaintiff/Respondent was that 
he didn't recall any conversation about the existence of the 
corporation. There was not testimony to indicate the intent, 
desire or understanding by either party that Defendant/Appellant 
Sorenson signed in an individual capacity nor as guarantor. 
In Speer v Friedland, 12 UCC Reporting Service 509, the 
Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District, had to decide 
a matter in which the question of the capacity in which an indi-
vidual signed a check was raised. In this matter, the Court 
quoted the Uniform Commercial Code §3-403, which is contained 
in Utah Code Annotated in §70-A-3-403, which provides in part 
that "(2) an authorized representative who signs his own name 
to an instrument: 
(a) Is personally obligated if the instrument neither 
names the pe~son represented nor shows that the representative 
signed in a representative cap~city; 
(b) Except as otherwise established between the immediate 
parties, is personally obligated if the instrument names the 
person represented, but does not show that the representative 
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signed in a representative capacity, or if the instrument does 
not name the person represented but does show that the represen-
tative signed in the representative capacity." In this matter, 
the Court held as follows: "In the case sub judice, the check 
signed by Appellant was ambiguous on its face as to whether 
she had signed as a co-maker or in a representative capacity. 
Parol evidence was therefore adrnissable to show the intention 
of the parties. 
Appellant testified that she never intended to sign 
the check in question in an individual capacity, but that she 
signed it in her representative capacity, which she had authority 
to do. Appel lee produced no evidence to controvert this testimony. 
The prsumption that she signed in a personal capacity was over-
come by the manifest weight of the evidence. The burden then 
shifted to Appellee to prove the issue by preponderance of the 
evidence, unaided by the presumption, which he failed to do." 
In the present case, we have a similar set of facts in 
that the testimony of Defendant/Appellant is very clear that 
there is no intention on his part to sign in any individual 
capacity. He also testifies that there was no request or dis-
cussion of his signing in any such personal capacity. Plaintiff/ 
Respondent in his testimony, does not claim that Defendant/Appellant 
signed in his personal capacity or as a guarantor, nor that he 
requested that he do so, nor that he understood that he did so. 
His testimony is only that he did not recall a discussion con-
cerning the fact that one of the parties to the transaction was 
a corporation. It seems obvious that in this matter the Plaintiff/ 
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Respondent has failed to prove the issue by a preponderance 
of the evidence unaided by any presumption in law. 
The parol evidence submitted to the Court below, was 
properly admitted because the note in question was ambiguous 
under the terms of §70-A-3-403 Utah Code Annotated. 
In J.P. Sivertson & Company v. Lolmaugh, 24 ucc Reporting 
Service 1212, the Court had to decide whether or not to allow 
such parol evidence. In this matter, the Court summarized the 
facts as follows: "On October 26, 1973, the defendant executed 
a promissory note to the plaintiff. The note was a demand note 
for $2,761.72 at 7% percent interest. The defendant signed 
the note in the following manner. On the first line he wrote 
the letters, "L.T.G. De.", and then on the next line immediately 
below the letters, the defendant affixed his signature." The 
Court recited §3-403 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which we 
have already cited in pertinent part and then held that "First 
the action must be between the immediate parties to the note. 
Secondly, there must be some indication of the existence of a 
principal or that the signator signed in a representative 
capacity." In the fact situation here, the Court held "The 
fact that the defendant wrote the letters above his signature 
is a clear indication that they were intended to authenticate 
the note by naming 'the person represented.'" The Court further 
held that the two elements required to allow parol evidence 
was present and that therefore the parol evidence was properly 
admitted below. In the present matter, the typewritten name 
of the corporation, American Heritage Builders, Inc. was placed 
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above the signature of Defendant/Appellant Sorenson, being a 
clear indication that the name American Heritage Builders, Inc. 
was intended to authenticate the note by naming the person 
representative and giving clear notice to Plaintiff/Respondent 
that the document was a corporate document. 
POINT II: THE RECOVERY, BY PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT, 
OF THE MOBILE HOME, WHICH WAS THE UNDERLYING OBLIGATION 
OF THE NOTE, TERMINATED ALL LIABILITY UNDER THE TERMS 
OF THE NOTE. 
In this matter, the note was given to show that American 
Heritage Builders, Inc. took possession of the mobile home and 
assumed the obligation to pay to Plaintiff/Respondent, the 
amount deducted from his paycheck and paid over to Cyprus Credit 
Union as payment for the mobile home. Plaintiff/Respondent did 
not have legal title, only an equitable title. Cyprus Credit 
Union retained title all through this course of affairs until 
such time as Plaintiff/Respondent recovered the mobile home at 
the sheriff's sale, resold it, satisfied the obligation to the 
credit union and realized the sum of Three Thousand Dollars 
($3,000.00) for himself in the transaction. 
In Dulio v Senechal, 7 UCC Reporting Service 222, the 
Massachusetts Appellate Division held that "The plaintiff has 
obtained restitution by being restored to the position he formerly 
occupied by the return of the 1959 Ford Sedan, which he formerly 
had." This was a case in which a credit union had issued a 
check to a car dealer to pay for a car purchased by Senechal, 
a credit union member, who had given the credit union his note 
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for the amount of the check. Senechal took possession of the 
car and gave the check to the dealer. The credit union then 
discovered that Senechal had lost his job so they stopped 
payment on the check. Senechal returned the car to the dealer, 
but the dealer sued for payment of the check. The court further 
held that "The conclusion is warranted that the check in plaintiff's 
possession had been satisfied and therefore that the Plaintiff may 
not recover the amount thereof. It is provided by G.L.c 106 §3-603 
[70-A-3-603, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended] that (l} 
the liability of any party is discharged to the extend of his 
payment or satisfaction to the holder ... and (2) payment or 
satisfaction may be made with the consent of the holder by any 
person ..•• " Chapter 8, §145 of the Restatment of the Law in the 
Courts, Restitution, provides as follows: A CAUSE OF ACTION 
FOR RESTITUTION AGAINST ANOTHER IS TERMINATED BY ITS MERGER 
IN A VALID JUDGMENT AGAINST THE OTHER, BASED UPON THE FACTS 
ESTABLISHING THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR RESTITUTION. 
Comment: 
a. Where a person obtains a judgment in his favor, the 
cause of action which he previously had is terminated by being 
merged in the judgment, that is, the duty to return a benefit, 
its value or proceeds, based upon the operative facts which led 
to the judgment, is ended and a new duty is created based solely 
upon the rendering of a judgment which is the crystalization 
and specific definition of the preceding duty. This rule results 
from the desirability of not having two distinct claims against 
one person, based upon the same operative facts, existing 
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simultaneously. Where a person has alternate remedies to sue, 
either in tort or in an action for restitution and has pursued 
one of these remedies to judgment, since the judgment terminates 
the right, it terminates also the unused remedy. 
b. In an action for the conversion of a chattel, a 
judgment for its value, until satisfied, does not transfer the 
title of a chattel to the judgment debtor, and, hence, the 
judgment creditor is entitled to regain a chattel thereafter at 
the expense, however, of losing his right to enforce the judgment. 
Illustration: 
a. A converts B's horse. B obtains a judgment against 
A in an action for conversion. B regains the horse without the 
use of force or a trespass on A's land. B is entitled to retain 
the horse, but not to enforce the judgment. 
Section 147 of Chapter 8, Restatement, Restitution, in 
Subsection (3) provides as follows: OBTAINING FULL SATISFACTION 
OF A JUDGMENT EITHER FOR DAMAGES OR FOR RESTITUTION AGAINST ONE 
OF TWO PERSONS SEVERALLY UNDER A DUTY OF RESTITUTION WITH 
REFERENCE TO THE SAME SUBJECT MATTER, TERMINATES THE RIGHT TO 
MAINTAIN AN ACTION AGAINST, OR TO OBTAIN SATISFACTION FROM, THE 
OTHER. 
Comment on Subsection (3): 
d. Where a claim against two persons is founded upon a 
single deprivation as it is where a tort resulting in a single 
harm has been committed by two persons concurrently or acting 
in cooperation, the injured person, while having a cause of 
action against each of the parties for the entire amount of 
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injury, is entitled to only one satisfaction. If he obtains 
judgment against one and it is satisfied, he thereby loses his 
claim against the other. In the instant case, judgment has 
been obtained against one of the parties to the lawsuit, American 
Heritage Builders, Inc. and restitution has been had by the 
recovery and resale, at a profit, to Plaintiff/Respondent of 
the mobile home. Under the cases cited and the Restatement of 
the Law and of the Sections of Utah Code Annotated cited, it is 
clear that Plaintiff/Respondent has been fully satisfied and 
restored to his former condition and that he has no further 
right under law or equity to pursue Defendant/Appellant for any 
further judgment in this matter. To so allow, would be uncon-
tionable and would unjustly enrich Plaintiff/Respondent. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant submits that he was not a party to 
the note, and is not obligated under it, but that American 
Heritage Builders, Inc. was the party to the note and that his 
signature is only as an agent therefore. Defendant/Appellant 
further submits that the note has been satisfied by the recovery 
of Plaintiff/Respondent of the mobile home and its resale and 
Plaintiff/Respondent may not recover further. 
Justice will best be served by reversing the decision of 
the Lower Court. 
Such action would be inconsistent with Utah Law, with 
the decisions of the several courts in the cases cited, and with 
the Restatement of the Law, Restitution. 
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Such action would also prevent the unjust enrichment 
of Plaintiff/Respondent and the unjust penalization of Defendant/ 
Appellant. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
N ROBERTSON 
ney for Defendant/Appellant 
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